I Stated:
“Perhaps it is better simply to state that all which is and can be observed, that is, anything observable, and therefore known empirically, is contingent, that if it exists now, it one day will not exist, and at one time did not exist, and therefore requires a necessary being, an unmoved mover who moves a thing from merely being potential to be actual. If a thing is not the cause of its own existence, which only nothing comes from nothing, but rather receives its existence from another, does not have the power to give existence to something that does not have it, since it does not have it within itself. Therefore, that which is contingent, anything with potentiality and therefore subject to change, can not move a thing from potentiality to actuality.”
Agnostic Reply:
“Energy is observable and therefore known empirically. All the things that we observe coming into existence forms by some sort of transformation of energy, or a change of some state or process.
'therefore requires a necessary being, an unmoved mover who moves a thing from merely being potential to be actual.' This is a claim that has no support.
And when you exempt a god from being contingent as a foregone conclusion, this is Special Pleading.”
My Response:
“If we were to use a rational demonstration as to why a chair is contingent, we would agree that we are not exempting the chair from being necessary without justified cause, but more accurately we would rather say that the chair was determined to be contingent and by logical necessity is not necessary? Would you agree with this? It certainly would be inappropriate to simply assume that a chair is not necessary without a justified cause, that is, without a rational demonstration that determines the nature of the chair, which proves that it is indeed contingent.”
Agnostic Reply:
“What makes a chair a chair is its ability to be sat on. An object is only in its category of objects so long as it fulfills its defining use to people.
What one person calls a chair another person might call a rock, step stool, a door stop or to be used to start a fire if made out of flammable material.
While the materials of this hypothetical chair are necessarily made out of atoms or molecules which did not form until about 300,000 years after the initial start of the most recent big bang event.
So, while the chair is contingent, what makes the atoms of the chair is necessary and even those atoms are contingent on the events that took place one millionth of a second after the Big Bang, which is when gravity, then the strong force, which holds nuclei of atoms together, followed by the weak and electromagnetic forces started to affect the universe.
Which itself is contingent on a form of energy that can suddenly push out the fabric of space.
Now, the trouble is, we do not know for sure what this "form of energy" actually is or where it came from. But what ever it was, it was necessary to continue the formation of space that we have today.
To postulate that this "form of energy" is a god or from a god will need some very strong evidence to support that hypothesis. Not some philosophical nonsense that only gets you to a nebulous god concept that could easily be Mbombo, Pangu, Brahma, some other creator deity or even The Invisible Pink Unicorn.”
My Response:
“In order to keep ourselves from speaking passed each other, I will state the following again because it was a question that I posed to you directly in response to your comment that 'excluding God from being contingent is special pleading'. "If we were to use a rational demonstration [that] a chair is contingent, we would agree that we are not exempting the chair from being necessary without justified cause, but more accurately we would rather say that the chair was determined to be contingent and by logical necessity is not necessary? Would you agree with this?"
I was hoping for a response because it would lead into a discussion about 'special pleading', which I will speak to in this response. If you are arguing against theism as a cogent philosophical system, I would actually recommend against positing other possible gods, beings, imaginary objects/animals. The attempts of Richard Dawkins in his book The God Delusion to critique Aquinas' 5 ways was very weak, and similar critiques along these same lines I find to exhibit a lack of understanding of exactly what is meant when a monotheist demonstrates God.
Just from looking up mbombo, it says that 'Mbombo was a giant in form and white in color" and that this being experienced pain in their stomach and vomited out aspects of creation. It also says that this being was "alone, darkness and primordial water covered the earth". Like many of these creation myths, they speak of creation via pre-existing matter, that the being was troubled in some manner even opposed by the elements, or in conflict with other beings, as we can see with beings like Apsu and Tiamat in Babylonian mythology.
Likewise, Pangu is also seen as a "hairy giant who has horns on his head". This being was said to have emerged from an egg that formed from a primordial state, created some things, and in this case is said to have died.
Brahma is said to be "one of the principal deities of Hinduism" and together with Vishnu and Shiva are referred to as Trimurti. It is a henotheistic idea that posits more than one divine being. Depending upon the legend one reads Brahma is depicted as having "created himself in a golden egg", as "emerging from the navel of Vishnu", or was "born from Shiva" or created by "Devi".
The Invisible Pink Unicorn is the most ancient being and its legends pre-date existence itself, lol. I joke, but this is my favorite. You mentioned special pleading in your original post and I would agree with you if for instance I proposed an Invisible Pink Unicorn and an Invisible Blue Unicorn but simply stated that the Invisible Blue Unicorn was contingent or non-existent but that the Invisible Pink Unicorn pre-existed all things and was a necessary being. Why? I like pink lol. This would be a very clear case of special pleading because there is no rational explanation for it, no justification for why the Invisible Pink Unicorn is different than the Invisible Blue Unicorn.
I would argue that in each of these creation myths there is a being with some contingent form. I would not argue for any of these myths because as I stated above, 1) there is primordial matter, sometimes that primordial state actually brought forth the being, 2) opposed or resisted by the primordial matter or even their subsequent formations, 3) there are rival beings in which they are in conflict. Much of this is seen in the Roman and Greek Pantheons, where human-like beings are born and are in conflict with one another. Of all these creation myths Scripture actually has aspects that are unique that distinguishes itself from the others. 1) God is the actual creator of all things and is not rivaled by any other god, because there are no other real gods, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth", likewise He was not born from nor existed along with a primordial state of which He was a part, nor did He take this primordial matter and form it to exist as our universe. 2) he is ruler over the elements, "the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters" - He controls, manages, subdues it, He is not in struggle with it, nor does it fight back against Him, 3) and creator of all beings/animals/etc "God created the great creatures of the sea" - God is not in tension against a Leviathan or a Behemoth, he would have been the one who created them. This leads me to posit a unique God that created all contingent things out of nothing, that is, not formed from pre-existant matter from a primordial state, nor from His own being, which actually has philosophical significance.
What makes God more profound of an idea than an Invisible Pink Unicorn is that God has within Himself all perfections, and let's be honest, the unicorn is just not very impressive, no matter how pink it is lol. In other words, God must be Subsistent Being Itself, the necessary cause of all being in contingent things. Being subsistent and being necessary, in God existence and essence is identical, that is, the essence of what God is is the explanation for his eternal existence. It is the very nature of His essence to exist, unlike contingent things that have existence given to them by something outside of itself. The answer to 'why is there something rather than nothing' is therefore as simple as 'there is something that is necessary' otherwise nothing would exist. How do we know? Because it is the very nature of contingent things to change, that is, from being to non-being, or from non-being to being, and therefore could not eternally exist, and would therefore direct us to an unchanging, eternal, necessary thing otherwise there would be no one around to ask, 'why is there nothing at all?' It certainly would be special pleading if we were to arbitrarily attribute necessity to one thing among others, but again, that is the point isn't it, God isn't just another 'thing' among others as if He belongs to a primordial state or came into being, or was in any way contingent. Consider this, an unchanging, eternal, necessary being would be infinitely what He is, that is, His essence does not limit His existence, and therefore there can only be one of what He is, because none other can have that nature, nor could He share a part of Himself through an emanation, or any other conception that makes God composite. God must be simple, must be Spirit, in which there is no potentiality, He must be pure actuality. There is this supreme idea in the mind, so profound, that it has not escaped our notice, and how much greater it is to exist outside of the mind.”
Agnostic Reply:
“Long post, so going to short cut, each number is the paragraph I am responding to:
1. No, and my reply still stands. Do not care about what Richard Dawkins said. But Thomas' 5 ways have been philosophized to death and are not compelling. Each time someone brings them up, they tend to bring up a refined version that needed to happen due to the first 5 being weak in a certain area.
3,4,5. Each of those deities can be substituted for "He" in your original claim that a god created the universe. Each one has just as much evidence for creating the universe as the other and you need to provide a method to filter out any other imaginary being that you or others want to fill in the small gap in knowledge that we have in the original formation of our current presentation of the universe. Current understanding of the STBBC (Scientific Theory of Big Bang Cosmology) does show that there was energy there at the start of this universe, what that energy actually was or how it acted is the small gap in our knowledge that you are trying to fit in a deity.
6. From the IPU vs IBU demonstration you seem to not know what "special pleading" means. "Special pleading is an informal fallacy wherein one cites something as an exception to a general or universal principle. This is the application of a double standard."
7. While YOU would not argue for any of them, they still fit into what you are arguing for. You make a claim, yet offer no reason why the claim should be accepted. The only evidence of the claim is the writings of Genesis. Those books are flawed in their history, science attempts and also seems to have mixed multiple prior religions into one.
8. An all perfect being would not create a world that it knew would not be perfect. Even the claimed fall of man is imperfect and thus not the work of a perfect being. This is where you start to go on with the special pleading. You give attributes to this being that you have no evidence for nor have any method to show that the being has those attributes. So, just like the IPU vs IBU you have picked your personal choice and then made faulty arguments for why your choice is better in a form of post hoc ergo propter hoc.
My Response:
“You still have not yet answered my question directly regarding the rational demonstration that a chair is contingent. If rational demonstration is sufficient then it is not special pleading to exclude the chair from being necessary, because there is sufficient reason that it is not necessary, namely the law of non-contradiction that a chair can not both be contingent and necessary. The point of the question is that if a rational demonstration is sufficient to explain that a chair is not necessary then it logically follows that rational demonstration is sufficient to explain the existence of something that is non-contingent, reasoning from the existence of contingent things, and that this whole constitutes as an evidence. If rational demonstration can be given that God is necessary then it is not a matter of special pleading, the rational basis is the justification for its distinction. We need to agree with a definition of 'special pleading'. I am saying that if I were to arbitrarily propose one thing over another "without providing adequate justification" then this would be a clear case of special pleading, and in which case I would agree with you that I was in fact doing this. But since I am demonstrating 'adequate justification', then the case is even more simple, you simply do not wish to follow reason where reason will take you, and you are using the term 'special pleading' to avoid having to address these distinctions and instead you are left with having to confound proposed contingent beings found within various myths with the philosophical argument I am making, instead of interacting with what I am saying on its own merit. And let's be honest regarding the definition of special pleading which you shared above, that it should be stated as the following: "Special pleading is an informal fallacy wherein one cites something as an exception to a general or universal principle (without justifying the special exception). This is the application of a double standard." - This is the citation directly from Wiki. What is the source of the definition you are using? Here is another definition which I alluded to earlier: "Applying standards, principles, and/or rules to other people or circumstances, while making oneself or certain circumstances exempt from the same critical criteria, without providing adequate justification." And yet another: "Special pleading occurs when someone dismisses a specific case as an exception to a rule without adequate reasons." In each case, you left out the one way for something not to be a case of special pleading, namely, that there must be "adequate justification, sufficient reason", otherwise any and all distinctions which deviate from a norm would be a case of 'special pleading'. In which case, the term would be useless and be without practical meaning for the purpose it is being used.
These proposed contingent beings would not fit into what I am arguing specifically because they are contingent. Anything that is contingent, such as a horned giant, or a being that dies, or had an origin, has a rival, etc, is not a sufficient explanation for all contingency. As I demonstrated before with the question 'why is there something rather than nothing', there are only contingent things presently in existence precisely because there is something that is necessary, a thing in which it is impossible for it to not exist, in other words, it has no potentiality for non-being, otherwise there would be nothing at all. All that which is contingent is not sufficient to explain its own existence, precisely because it does not have existence of itself, it has been given existence to it by something outside of itself. What I am saying is that if all that which is contingent is not sufficient reason for its existence then we must logically look to something that is not contingent for an explanation, and this would be something that exists necessarily.
We do not see this in these so-called "creation myths", because from what I have been shown here is that the myths do not believe in creation at all, at least not creatio ex nihilo, but they posit some eternal primordial state which was formed by some being which is limited, is born, dies, and therefore contingent, or it was this being, or the being is used to personify said state, or this state brought about a being, once again, contingent. Of course, if there are other myths of this sort which you wish to propose I will be more than willing to assess them as well but for the most part you will find more of the same. But let me circle back to that which is necessary, and determine what must be true of this necessity. It is the nature of a thing that is necessary to have no potentiality for non-being, it would be impossible for it not to exist, and therefore it is eternal, and the primary cause of being in all contingent things, otherwise contingent things would not exist. It could not have any of the attributes of contingency such that it can not be composite, and therefore must be simple spirit. It must also not be limited in any way of what it is, comprising in perfection what is natural to it, therefore it could be the only thing with its nature, and it would be infinitely what it is. It would be incorporeal, so it would not have a specific form and therefore beyond empirical observation. This rational demonstration leads us from all which is contingent to something that is necessary, not having any of the attributes of contingent things, and logically what are the attributes of a thing that necessarily exists. This explanation which is necessary, pure spirit, eternal, creator of all contingent things, and implies intellect such that this creation produced intellectual beings and that all which we observe is intelligible, purposely ordered in a manner to be apprehended by an intellect, naturally leads us to wonder what this explanation is. This is exactly what the Catholic Church teaches about God.
Your final thought is based in the question: Is this the best of all possible worlds? Some point to the existence of imperfection in this world in order to argue that God could not be a perfect being, comprised of all perfections, who freely choose to create this world out of His goodness to the exclusion of all other possible worlds. The most obvious question to ask is what do you consider to be the best of all possible worlds? If God was the sole cause of every effect, or that the cosmos ultimately is comprised of a single will, then I would certainly agree with you that this world would tell us more about God than it would tell us about ourselves. But, while God is the primary cause of being, the basis for our existence and activity, contingent things engage in secondary causation. God, in being the primary cause, is not to be confused with the first cause in a chain of causation, but rather that God is the uncaused cause of all causation itself. God did not create a world in which there was only one will expressing itself through all the merely apparent wills of human beings, who are said to be created in the image and likeness of God, having will and intellect. Rather, the best possible world would be one where God truly shares His goodness with others, who in turn can freely participate in that goodness and direct it back to God and towards others. Unlike a necessary being who always acts in accordance with its own nature, contingent beings can direct their wills toward their proper end or not. It remains possible for contingent beings to change for the better or for the worse, to live in accordance with virtue or to degrade itself in vice.
Consider this, can a necessary being create another necessary being? The answer is clearly no because it is self-contradictory. It is like asking if God can create a square circle. It is only the nature of contingent things to be moved from non-being to being, from potency to actuality, and this excludes things that are by nature necessary, and therefore pure actuality and Subsistent Being Itself. There is and can only be one thing that is necessary. That means, that anything which God creates would be contingent, and those things would have all of the attributes of contingency. God having created a world of contingency implies that the best of all possible worlds would be one that is contingent and have all the attributes of contingency. To point to a thing done by something contingent, a thing that is possible to a contingent thing, such that it moves from potency to actuality, denotes that all that which is actualized logically excludes the actualization of the contrary, and here lies the basis for free will. As I asked above, "what do you consider to be the best of all possible worlds?" Would you claim that the only way you would consider God to be perfect is if he did not create anything at all? Especially since if He were to create anything at all it would be contingent, and therefore have all the attributes of contingency, including the potency to do good and to do evil, to direct things towards their natural end or to pervert them, to engage in the practice of virtue or to fall into depravity. Perhaps you are imagining a world in which all contingent things always willed the good and never actualized the potential for evil. I would propose this, it seems very unlikely that everyone, everywhere, and always would always choose to actualize good, and even though it was always possible to actualize evil it was always avoid. I would argue 1) that if God were to create at all it would be contingent, and 2) that the nature of contingent things implies that they will not act necessarily. And it would seem highly improbable that we would get the same result from contingent things as if they did act necessarily. It seems more plausible that contingent things would eventually actualize a wide variety of potency, perhaps exemplified by various expressions, though in a much more pessimistic manner, such that "if it can go wrong, it will go wrong" and again, "given enough time, all possible things will become actual". I certainly would not claim that God is somehow imperfect if a contingent thing acts contingently, having the possibility to do a thing or not to do it. Therefore, I disagree with your proposal that a perfect being would not create if the only possible world had the potential not to be perfect. Like I said, you would need to be more specific in what you mean by perfect, because it is the nature of a necessary being to have within Himself all perfections, yet it is the nature of contingent things to be limited and not be comprised of any perfections at all, but only participating in said attributes but only to varying degrees.
Building upon this understanding of the nature of contingent things, is the understanding of the potential that is created in contingent things when they are faced with adversity. To use a line from John Wesley's sermon God's Love to Fallen Man, he says "...mankind in general have gained, by the fall of Adam, a capacity of attaining more holiness and happiness on earth than it would have been possible for them to attain if Adam had not fallen." Again he says, "As God’s permission of Adam’s fall gave all his posterity a thousand opportunities of suffering, and thereby of exercising all those passive graces which increase both their holiness and happiness; so it gives them opportunities of doing good in numberless instances; of exercising themselves in various good works, which otherwise could have had no being. And what exertions of benevolence, of compassion, of godlike mercy, had then been totally prevented!" We would not know God as a savior, we would not know forgiveness, nor would we know what it would be to act heroically in the face of evil. Perhaps the best of all possible worlds is that world in which we have "a capacity of attaining more holiness and happiness on earth than it would have been possible for them to attain if Adam had not fallen."
